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This article provides a typology of rebel 
groups in the Middle East from the per-
spective of political science and situates 
them in a broader context of rebellion 
around the world.
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Defining a Rebel
We define a rebel as a member of rebel 
groups that oppose existing national gov-
ernments militarily and have political 
goals. This definition of armed political 
opposition will exclude members of some 
armed groups such as government mili-
tias or criminal groups with purely profit 
motives. In our discussion, a rebel will be 
an individual, embedded in a collective 
group, with political goals such as taking 
over the central government or achieving 
political autonomy or territorial indepen-
dence. He or she is the person who 
decided to take up arms to achieve that 
goal, in opposition to the status quo pro-
vided by the government. This will also 
exclude some peace movements and 
unarmed rebellions.
In this article, we will focus on a rebel 
“group” as our key analytical unit. Why 
choose to study a group rather than an 
individual rebel as a key unit of analysis? 
Rebel groups are cohesive units with a cer-
tain political goal. We think studying those 
groups with definitive characteristics will 
be a profitable approach in understand-
ing political, social and economic behav-
iors surrounding rebels. Our emphasis on 
“group” might sacrifice the individualities, 
but will simplify the characteristics of rebel 
elements in the world. The analytical lever-
age gained from looking at rebel groups 
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and organizations will be helpful in under-
standing rebellion, as rebel groups are 
producers of political strategies, social 
networks, and military tactics.
Our conceptual definition coincides with 
the ordinary definition of rebels, but with 
a focus on the group-dimension. The dic-
tionary definitions of a rebel contain the 
ideas of progressivism and unorthodoxy. 
The word, rebel, is associated with a chal-
lenge to the traditions of an existing 
authority. Rebels usually desire indepen-
dence and autonomy, seeking to establish 
their own social, political, and sometimes 
religious order. The associated adjectives 
included are dissident, subversive, and 
rebutting—highlighting the nature of a 
rebel to defy the status quo. In our con-
ceptual, definitional boundary, rebel 
groups resist the political status quo col-
lectively and with military means.
Beyond such conceptual boundaries, the 
empirical boundaries of a rebel have 
never been certain. The meaning, conno-
tation, and classification of aliases— free-
dom fighters or terrorists, for instance—
have varied over time and between 
regions. On one hand, freedom fighters 
(or liberation movements) was often used 
during the de-colonization periods in the 
1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, ter-
rorist groups have substantial overlap 
with rebel groups: some domestic indi-
vidual terrorists are not classified as orga-
nized rebels, and terrorist groups with 
global aims are not easily classified as 
rebels (Jo). But, many rebel groups use 
terrorist tactics and are thus identified as 
terrorists (Fortna).
With this empirical backdrop, we will use 
the following operational definition of 
rebel groups: armed organizations that 
engaged in actual battle against national 
government forces, generating at least 25 
battle deaths in a civil conflict. This will 
include some terrorist groups as well as 
liberation movements, but exclude some 
armed groups such as government mili-
tias or criminal gangs. The empirical defi-
nition will also exclude some small rebel 
groups that may have had little military 
impact, such as initiators of peaceful, 
social movements.
With this conceptual and operational def-
inition of rebels, the goal of this article is 
to provide a typology of rebel groups 
from a political science perspective, with 
application to the Middle Eastern (ME) 
rebel groups. Our focus is to uncover the 
commonalities and differences between 
the rebel groups in the Middle East vs. 
those of the rest of the world.
Specifically, we will argue that ME rebel 
groups are unique in two aspects: 1) reli-
gious divides run deep in many rebel 
movements, and 2) global aims of some 
groups are not easily found in other parts 
of the world. We will also argue that ME 
rebel groups share many traits with rebel 
groups in other parts of the world, in par-
ticular, with respect to the relationship 
with their core constituencies/supporters 
or rebellion tactics.
In our analysis, we will take a fairly expan-
sive definition of the Middle East region—
spanning from Northern Africa (e.g. Alge-
ria, Tunisia), the Persian Gulf countries (e.g. 
Iran, Iraq, Yemen), as well as neighboring 
countries in the east (e.g. Afghanistan). 
The temporal focus of this article is con-
temporary, mainly covering the post-Cold 
War period, from 1990 to the present day.
Classification of Rebels
Before we provide our typology of ME 
rebel groups, we review the literature in 
political science on the classification of 
rebels in the context of internal armed 
conflicts. Three subfields of political sci-
ence—international relations, comparative 
politics, and political economy—all deal 
with the issues of civil conflicts. We identify 
five major classifications in those strands 
of literature.
The first dominant theme in the civil war 
literature has been the dichotomy 
between greed-based rebels versus griev-
ance-based rebels (Collier and Hoeffler). 
Rebels based on “greed” usually have 
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profit seeking motives, consequently deal-
ing with lootable resources, such as dia-
monds or drugs. The Revolutionary United 
Front in Sierra Leone is usually classified in 
this greed category for their sales of dia-
monds in funding their rebellion. Rebels 
with “grievances” focus more on political 
solutions rather than economic profits. 
These usually include conflicts involving 
ethnic minorities or secessionism. The 
rebellion waged by the Karen National 
Union in Myanmar can be an example of 
grievance-based rebellion, as the group, 
based on Karen ethnicity, aims at their 
own Karen state.
The second classification involves what 
rebel groups aim at (Sobek and Payne). 
Some have aims to capture the central 
government (center aim) while others 
want to retain autonomy in their own 
region (peripheral aim). For example, Nax-
alites in India have a center aim while the 
rebels in Nagaland have a peripheral aim. 
The Naxalite-Maoist insurgency was not 
confined to a region but extended to sub-
verting the ideology and operation of the 
central Indian Government. This national 
aim is in contrast to that of the National 
Socialist Council of Nagaland which 
focuses on the Naga territory in the north-
east India. The distinction between seces-
sionist and non-secessionist rebels also 
has its roots in rebel goals (Fazal).
The third classification hinges on how 
rebel groups evolve. In his study on Afri-
can politics, Reno identified five sets of 
rebel groups: 1) “anti-colonial” rebels that 
fought against colonial rulers, 2) “majority-
rule” rebels that were against minorities in 
South Africa, 3) “reform” rebels that 
worked to build a state, 4) “warlord” rebels 
that remained as destabilizing forces, and 
5) “parochial” rebels with local concerns. 
This classification is based on a historical 
trajectory of rebel groups in Africa.
The fourth and most recent classification 
hinges on rebels’ institutional features. 
Weinstein studies rebel organizations and 
provides classification of opportunistic 
rebels vs. activist rebels. Opportunistic 
rebels are often resource-dependent and 
violence-prone. Activist rebels are usually 
committed to social ideals and are embed-
ded within their society. More recently, 
Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 
suggest many institutional features of 
rebel groups, such as political wings, 
external funding bases, as well as com-
mand and control structures. The work by 
Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 
does not necessarily produce different 
categories for classification, but provides 
the basis for understanding diverse 
dimensions of rebel groups. These devel-
opments are additions to the studies of 
civil conflicts that contributed to the clas-
sification of rebel groups and our disag-
gregated understanding of their nature 
and operation.
Compared to twenty years ago, our under-
standing of rebel groups has improved 
over time. With the classifications men-
tioned above, the study on rebel groups 
has become more objective, beyond 
political connotations in normal parlance. 
Recent studies are beginning to recognize 
the deep links between terrorism studies 
and civil war studies (Findley and Young). 
This cross-fertilization will be an ongoing 
trend for the study of rebel groups.
The classification of a rebel is important 
because it brings with it profound social, 
legal, and political consequences.
Social consequences include “naming 
and shaming.” If rebels are branded as 
freedom fighters, social acceptance is 
implicitly present. But if rebels are branded 
as outlaw actors, they are often regarded 
as criminals.
Legal consequences include whether a 
rebel can sustain the effort for its move-
ment. The Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
tions (FTO) list designated by the United 
States is one example. Once designated 
as a FTO, the group is unable to get 
material support from humanitarian 
organizations, diaspora populations, and 
other private entities.
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The political consequences of being 
branded a rebel include the loss of politi-
cal legitimacy in mainstream politics. Many 
national governments use this strategy of 
branding certain oppositions as rebels, in 
order to de-legitimize their activities—
mainly to re-assert their own political 
authority and legitimacy. This delineation 
of the “ruler” and the “ruled” prompts 
political conflicts—from accusations to 
downright military confrontations.
Charting the Map of Middle East Rebel 
Groups
To provide a systematic and comprehen-
sive study of ME rebel groups, we have 
collected the data on ME rebel groups fol-
lowing our conceptual and operational 
definition. The result is Table 1 (see supple-
ment 1). The table lists the rebel groups 
operating in the Middle East between 
1946 and 2015.
In creating the list of Middle Eastern rebel 
groups, the operational definition in the 
Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunning-
ham, Gleditsch and Salehyan) was fol-
lowed and expanded to include recent 
Middle Eastern groups. The NSA dataset 
follows the definition of armed conflicts 
from the UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram) project and defines a conflict as “a 
contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of 
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths.” This definition excludes some 
small or weak groups that failed to gener-
ate a count of 25 battle-deaths and groups 
that did not directly engage in military 
confrontations.
Rebels in the Middle East are not typical 
rebels but have political, religious, and 
social layers. There are several, important 
points in Table 1 that highlight the similar-
ities and differences of Middle Eastern 
rebel groups compared to other rebel 
groups worldwide. Some features high-
light the uniqueness of the rebel groups 
of the Middle East versus other regions.
The first prominent feature we can 
observe is the religious dimension of 
many rebel movements. The groups 
described are mostly Islamic, with 29 out 
of 35 groups (83%). The affiliation of Islam 
is largely determined by the group’s pro-
fessed identity and the creed of the 
majority of its members, and we identified 
the religion based on the previous studies 
of each group relying on the key sources 
such as the narratives from the START 
dataset, the Non-State Actor dataset, and 
other secondary sources. A substantial 
majority of groups adhere to the Sunni 
sect of Islam in this list: i.e. 23 groups 
(66%). Groups adhering to the Shia sect 
of Islam are the second largest religious 
group, totaling 4 groups (11%). The rest of 
the groups are categorized as mixed 
Islamic sects, like the Northern Alliance 
and KDPI (6%); Maronite Christian groups 
(6%); or secular groups that avoid reli-
gious affiliation (11%).
The second unique feature of ME rebel 
groups is the stark contrast in the scope 
of the groups’ aims. Some ME rebel 
groups have strictly domestic goals while 
others wage a globally-oriented struggle. 
This division defines the scope of the 
group’s reach, levels of exposure to inter-
national audiences, and the perceived 
salience of their struggle. The global aim 
of some rebel groups is simply not pres-
ent in the rebel organizations of other 
parts of the world.
The domestic struggle of ME rebel groups 
usually involves minorities in a conflict 
against authorities over their political 
rights. One such example is Jundallah in 
Iran, an ethnically Baluch group, which has 
been engaged in a long standing conflict 
with the government. Another example of 
domestic struggle is the uprising of rebel 
groups related to the Kurdish ethnic 
minority. The Kurds are a very large ethnic 
group spread over several Middle Eastern 
countries, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria. Within those countries, the Kurds are 
a minority fighting to achieve a certain 
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degree of political freedom or indepen-
dence. In Turkey, the Revolutionary Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (DHKP/C) and the 
Maoist Communist Party of Turkey and 
North Kurdistan (MKP) are the main Kurd-
ish rebel groups. In Iran, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the 
Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) have 
waged wars against the Iranian regime. In 
Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
has been active (Van Bruinessen). For its 
part, the conflict in Yemen presents a 
slightly different version of domestic 
struggle, where the Huthis exert strong 
opposition to the central government 
which attempted to extend its authority to 
the semi-autonomous region of Saʿda in 
the north (Salmoni et al.).
The opposite end of the spectrum involves 
groups with a more global orientation of 
their goals. In the case of ME rebel groups, 
the aims are mostly spreading their reli-
gious beliefs with the plan of establishing 
an Islamic Caliphate. Al-Qaʿida and its 
affiliations, such as Al-Qaʿida in the Ara-
bian Peninsula (AQAP) which is active in 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia, have led this 
quest for over 20 years. These groups fight 
to expel all external, specifically Western 
and American, presences from the Middle 
East and to establish Islamic governments. 
Over the last two years, ISIS, an Islamic, 
extremist rebel group was established by 
former Al-Qaʿida members, with the 
global aim of establishing an Islamic 
caliphate in the Middle East. This Islamic 
empire could stretch over to other regions, 
such as Europe or Africa.
The third feature of ME rebel groups con-
cerns the groups’ interaction with foreign 
interventionists. Examples of rebel 
groups fighting domestic forces, such as 
Jundallah or Huthis, were discussed ear-
lier in the domestic struggle context. 
Those conflicts sometimes suffer from a 
limited number of paths to resolution and 
may last for many years, such as the Kurd-
ish struggle for autonomy. On the other 
hand, rebel groups fighting external 
intervention generally face two types of 
adversaries: 1) external actors controlling 
their territory on a permanent basis or 2) 
external actors controlling a territory on 
a temporary basis.
The former type can be described as rebel 
groups fighting to expel foreign authori-
ties which, they believe, control their terri-
tory and negate political rights, prevent-
ing independence. The Palestinian rebel 
groups belong to this category. Israel has 
partial control over disputed territories. 
Palestinian groups, such as Fatah or AMB, 
promote a struggle for Israel’s withdrawal 
and Palestine’s independence. A more 
extreme version of this struggle is con-
ducted by Hamas and the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Those groups believe 
all of present-day Israel is occupied Pales-
tinian territories. Their goal is to liberate all 
Israeli and Israeli-occupied lands to create 
the nation of Palestine. PIJ and Hamas add 
a religious dimension to their struggle, 
specifically an Islamic affiliation.
The latter type involves groups fighting for 
the removal of outside intervention forces 
which control a territory on a temporary 
basis, such as the US presence in Afghan-
istan and Iraq. Another effect in this cate-
gory is that when the local government is 
influenced by a foreign entity, often the 
US, those rebel groups refuse to accept its 
legitimacy. This pattern is exemplified by 
the insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq 
over the last 12-15 years and the activities 
of rebel groups like Al-Qaʿida, the Taliban, 
Jamʿiyat-i-Islami, ISIS, Ansar al-Islam, and 
the Al-Mahdi Army. Those groups have 
fought for the removal of outside interven-
tion forces and local governments influ-
enced by foreign entities. Most of these 
groups fight with the aim of installing a 
government based on Islamic law.
Finally, governance functions of the ME 
rebel groups are worth mentioning. Some 
groups are strictly of a military nature and 
have no political representation or gover-
nance functions. Examples of this are 
extreme ideological groups, like PIJ in Pal-
estine or Al-Qaʿida. Other rebel groups 
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exhibit some governance functions, main-
taining military and political wings. As a 
subset of these governing rebels, the 
political wing is responsible for local rep-
resentation or representation in the 
national or regional councils. Some of the 
Afghani groups fit this description. 
Jamʿiyat-i-Islami has political representa-
tion in the government and the parlia-
ment in Afghanistan. Hizb-i Islami has 
both general representations in the 
Afghan cabinet and local positions of 
governance (Katzman). The Iraqi group, 
Jammat al Sadr al Tahni is the political 
wing of the Al Mahdi Army and is a mem-
ber of the Iraqi Parliament (National Con-
sortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism Dataset). Groups 
like Hamas, Fatah, and PNA have gover-
nance functions in their respective areas 
(see Table 1 (see supplement 1)). The PNA 
is the recognized Palestinian authority, 
while Fatah is the main party in this body. 
Hamas became the governing body in the 
Gaza strip following the 2006 elections. 
Hizbullah, a Lebanese based Shia rebel 
group, has a large military wing, but from 
the governance angle it participates in the 
general elections and is a large member 
in parliament (Lob). A significant part of 
this representation is a function of its 
social operations within the Shia popula-
tion. Hizbullah works in government to 
provide basic social services, but to also 
contribute to larger projects, like the 
reconstruction of Shia neighborhoods in 
Beirut and elsewhere following the civil 
war and confrontations with Israel (Cam-
mett).
The last group in this discussion may be a 
type in and of itself. ISIS aims to occupy all 
Islamic territories and establish a caliph-
ate. In order to accomplish this, ISIS 
employs a different model of organization 
from that which is common for rebel and 
terrorist groups.
First, ISIS uses extensive military power to 
conquer territory and erase any possible 
opposition using extreme measures. The 
famous beheadings and other violent 
attacks on its adversaries exemplify this 
tactic by the ISIS.
The second aspect is a governance model 
of multiple offices and bureaus handling 
different issues such as finance, civilian 
life, and more. This governance feature is 
easily observed in some rebel groups with 
deep connections to domestic popula-
tions, but is not easily observed among 
groups branded as terrorists, making the 
case of ISIS a bit unique. This governance 
function of ISIS features two prime catego-
ries. The first category is an administrative 
one which handles religious outreach and 
enforcement, the judicial system, the edu-
cational system, and public relations. The 
other is a service-oriented office which 
manages humanitarian aid and key infra-
structures, like electricity and the water 
supply. This office has taken on even larger 
scale projects which provide services, 
such as dams and a thermal power plant 
in the Aleppo province of Syria (Cronin; 
Caris and Reynolds).
Many ME rebel groups are branded as ter-
rorists. The most common offences are 
child soldiering; suicide bombings; kill-
ings; and violent acts committed against 
civilians. Most groups show negligent or 
intentional disregard for civilian safety and 
life, as most commit varying forms of 
attacks that endanger civilians. This negli-
gent or intentional disregard for civilian 
safety is exemplified through practices of 
indiscriminate fire, indiscriminate attacks, 
the use of IEDs and anti-personnel mines, 
forced displacement, civilian killings, sui-
cide bombings, and ethnic cleansing.
Suicide bombings are a common practice 
used by ME groups, but are not limited to 
Islamic groups. For example, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
and Devrimci Sol have a history of using 
suicide bombings, despite being secular 
groups desiring political autonomy. These 
examples demonstrate that rebel groups 
add suicide bombing to the repertoire of 
their tactics of rebellion when they need it, 
not necessarily due to religious reasons. In 
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the past few decades suicide bombings 
have become widespread in the region. 
They have been committed most often in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Leba-
non, Yemen, and Syria. From 1982-2015, 
suicide bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan 
totaled more than all worldwide suicide 
attacks combined (The Chicago Project on 
Security and Terrorism).
Typology of Rebels in the Middle East
In this section, we propose a typology of 
rebel groups in the Middle East. The types 
are based on previous literature on rebel 
groups and civil wars, as well as our 
research on ME rebel groups in Table 1 
(see supplement 1). Our primary goal is to 
illuminate the distinct features of the Mid-
dle Eastern groups as well as the com-
monalities they share with other groups in 
other parts of the world. The comparisons 
are mostly drawn from the main author’s 
works (Jo). The typology is based on rebel 
groups’ relationships with their political 
audiences as well as rebel tactics and 
strategies. Therefore, in future studies it 
can be used as an analytical framework to 
investigate rebel group behaviors and to 
understand their political and social envi-
ronments.
We identify five sets of rebel groups in 
the Middle East: 1) “ruler” rebels that 
have public good provision functions 
(e.g. Hizbullah), 2) recognition-seeking 
“diplomat” rebels (e.g. PLO), 3) “terrorist” 
rebels (e.g. ISIS), 4) “warlord” rebels (e.g. 
Afghanistan rebels), and 5) “exile” rebels 
(e.g. Jundallah, MEK).
The first set is “ruler” rebels. Cammett’s 
work on Hizbullah running public pro-
grams and social services, including 
health-care provisions or protection func-
tions, is now well-known. Governance 
functions also include the activities of 
political parties to build local constituen-
cies, as Table 1 (see supplement 1) indi-
cates. These “governor” rebel groups are 
found in other parts of the world. For 
example, Maoists in Nepal exhibited 
extensive governing functions, such as 
running schools or political programs 
(Huang). M23 in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo attempted to “protect” civilians 
and taxed civilians in the territory they 
controlled (Gorur). Given that these fea-
tures appear in other regions, this ruler-
feature is not a distinct characteristic of the 
ME rebel groups. But the comparison tells 
us that ME groups are not that different in 
some aspects from those in other parts of 
the world. Rebels’ core functions are in 
their attempts to fill the void by establish-
ing their own rules and order where gov-
ernment control is lacking.
The second set is “diplomat” rebels. Some 
rebel groups actively conduct diplomacy 
to seek recognition from other states. The 
PLO is a prime example for a diplomat 
rebel, with extensive diplomacy networks 
within the United Nations and obtaining 
observer status. MEK has an effective lob-
bying machine in the United States—it was 
taken off of the Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
tion list by building political networks in 
the US Congress. Other groups engage 
transnational actors such as international 
non-governmental organizations to build 
their own social networks in the interna-
tional system. For example, the Huthis in 
Yemen engaged in negotiations with the 
United Nations Special Representative for 
Children and Armed Conflict  to reduce 
the use of child soldiers in their ranks. 
There are ten other rebel groups that have 
signed the UN action plans to ban the 
child soldiering in other parts of the world, 
so this diplomatic effort is not unique to 
the ME rebels, but it is informative to note 
that this rebel diplomatic activity is also 
present in the Middle East.
The third set is “terrorist” rebels. Being 
branded as terrorists always carries politi-
cal connotations depending on who des-
ignates a group as terrorists. But some 
rebel groups do engage in terrorist acts 
that generate physical and psychological 
terror against their enemies or innocent 
civilians. Human rights violations listed in 
Table 1 (see supplement 1) are an indica-
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tion that rebel groups engage in the acts 
that could violate the principles of human 
dignity in pursuit of their political goals. 
One prominent example is the Islamic 
State. ISIS is not commonly thought of as 
a rebel because of its prominence in 
global aims for spreading and imposing 
Islamic order and its regional aim of creat-
ing a caliphate. However, the group exhib-
its rebel elements in fighting against the 
Asad government in Syria and fighting 
against the Iraqi government. ISIS is rather 
categorized as a terrorist organization 
than a rebel organization due to its so-
called terror tactics, as exemplified in the 
group’s treatment of Yazidis.
The fourth set is “warlord” rebels. Warlords 
are characterized by personal authority, 
commercial activity, and factional strug-
gles, not aiming for the reconstruction of 
national politics (Reno). Afghanistan is a 
prime example of warlord politics. The 
Taliban still control many parts of Afghan-
istan, commandeering the drug fields in 
the Helmand region. Many warlords 
ceased fighting against Soviet rule and 
took positions in the government, holding 
local powers and commandeering com-
mercial activities. For example, Ahmad 
Shah Masʿud was dubbed the “Lion of the 
Panjshir” (local rule); Ismail Kahn, previ-
ously the Governor of Herat Province and 
a key member of the Jamʿiyat-i-Islami, 
became the minister of water and energy 
(government position) (Kaphle). Warlord 
politics are not confined to Afghanistan. 
We discover such dynamics in some Afri-
can states and eastern Myanmar as well. In 
Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire, and 
Nigeria, in particular, have experienced 
warlord politics, with many rebel leaders 
behaving like warlords (Reno). In Myan-
mar, the opium warlord, Khun Sa, made or 
broke rebel groups such as the Shan 
United Army and the Mong Tai Army, 
engaged in factional politics and the drug 
trade, sometimes even co-opting the gov-
ernment (Staniland).
The fifth set is “exile” rebels. Jundallah is 
located in Iraq but fights for the Sunni 
Muslims in Iran, a predominantly Shia 
nation. Mujahidin-i Khalq (MEK) was based 
in Iraq but also fought against the Iranian 
regime. Although some rebel leadership 
circles reside in Europe as many African 
rebel group leaders do, the key purpose 
has been to connect to the western world 
for lobbying (in the case of MEK) or to gar-
ner support from diaspora populations (in 
the case of PKK). The exile rebels have 
exhibited some overlapping qualities with 
diplomat rebels, as they expand their 
activities beyond their motherlands.
Note that these categories are not mutu-
ally exclusive categories. Many rebel 
groups take on multiple titles. ISIS for 
example exhibited “ruler” functions in the 
al-Raqqa region but is also branded as 
“terrorist” due to its acts toward the Yazi-
dis. The remaining puzzle which current 
scholarship has not quite solved is the 
overlapping qualities of rebel groups. 
Why do some ME rebel groups exhibit the 
qualities of “governors” while they are 
branded as terrorists? Are these in-group 
vs. out-group behaviors where rebel 
groups play governors vis-à-vis their sup-
porters while terrorizing “others”? Are the 
seemingly contrasting behaviors the result 
of strategic calculations of rebels at differ-
ent time periods? Is it plausible to think 
that rebel groups violate the rules of the 
game when they get desperate, following 
the logic laid out in the work of Downes? 
Alternatively, do the rebels fill the void in 
the provision of public goods where state 
service is not simply available?
There are some additional notable fea-
tures of ME groups vis-à-vis other parts of 
the world. Religion runs deep in the case 
of Middle Eastern rebel groups. The divi-
sion between Sunnis and Shias is unpar-
alleled. The resource war is less pro-
nounced in the case of ME groups. Even 
though control of oil fields by ISIS high-
lights that resources, particularly oil, can 
play a role in rebel activity, it is less pro-
nounced than that of gems in Africa or 
drugs in Latin America, which have been 
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used to advance the economic interests 
of rebel groups.
Typologies usually involve multiple under-
lying dimensions (Skaaning and Møller). 
The key dimensions of this typology are 
the relationships with other political 
actors—the relationships with domestic 
populations, the relationships with the 
outside world, and the relationship with 
the opposing state. “Ruler” rebels and 
“warlord” rebels are concerned with their 
relationship with the domestic population. 
“Diplomat” rebels and “terrorist” rebels 
are characterized by relationships with the 
outside world. While “diplomat” rebels 
reach out to powerful international actors 
seeking recognition, “terrorist” rebels are 
often branded as criminals by the outside 
world. For their part, “ruler” rebels and 
“exile” rebels form special relationships 
with the opposing states: “ruler” rebels are 
in competition for governance functions 
and “exile” rebels try to exert influence 
from outside the state.
The second dimension is the rebels’ tac-
tics and strategies. In achieving their polit-
ical goals, rebel groups pick and choose 
which strategies best suit them. “Ruler” 
rebel groups decide to provide gover-
nance functions in civilian areas they hope 
to rule one day. “Diplomat” rebel groups, 
usually secessionist groups (Huang), make 
international political strategies a priority, 
in order to advance their goals of building 
an independent state. International politi-
cal strategies are important for “exile” 
groups as well, because they have to sur-
vive outside of their key domain. MEK’s 
fight to acquire a base in Iraq illustrates 
this point. As an Iranian dissent group, 
MEK has struggled to find a base of oper-
ations (Masters). Lastly, the tactics 
employed by “terrorist” and “warlord” 
rebel groups are well known. Terrorism 
involves violence against civilians with the 
political intention of creating physical and 
psychological damage (Gaibulloev and 
Sandler), whereas warlord rebel groups 
are often grounded economically and 
politically with local networks and shifting 
alliances (Christia). The two dimensions of 
rebel typology are summarized in Table 2 
(see supplement 1).
The suggested typology is useful for sev-
eral purposes. First, the types can be used 
for descriptive purposes. The typology is 
not unique to ME groups, so the types can 
be used for describing and classifying 
rebel groups in other parts of the world. 
Second, the types can also be used for 
analytical purposes. Since the typology’s 
key dimension is about how rebel groups 
forge relations within and outside their 
society, we can study how each type is dif-
ferent in terms of behaviors in political vio-
lence. For example, future studies can test 
the hypothesis that “diplomat” rebels 
reduce violence over time. Or, using the 
typology, future studies can focus on dif-
ferent propensities of rebel types to nego-
tiate or co-opt. For instance, we could test 
whether warlord rebels are easier to co-
opt compared to terrorist groups.
Conclusion
This article demonstrated that the classifi-
cation of a rebel carries a complex issue 
that is laden with political, social, and legal 
consequences. The question of who a 
rebel is will have to be answered before 
we act on certain policies, and before we 
forge responses to a potential rebellion.
Our analysis that examines ME rebels and 
compares them to rebel groups in other 
parts of the world shows that ME rebels 
are not anomalies. They share governance 
qualities and conduct diplomacy vis-à-vis 
the outside world. The differences, how-
ever, stand out with deep religious divides 
and occasional global aims.
We are left with a tangled web of religion, 
ideology, military strategies, and political 
motivations. The typology provided here 
is an attempt at clarifying the situation, but 
other classifications and different levels of 
understanding should be forthcoming in 
order to see how rebellion is waged and 
in what ways it evolves in the context of 
both local and global arenas.
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